In standard Indian historiography, the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, is generally considered as the beginning of the period of Moden India. This does not mean that modernity suddenly emerged in India when Aurangzeb died, rather to suggest that it was an important even a watershed in Indian history.

What can be the reasons for 1707 to be considered as the beginning of Modern India? Was it that significant an event. I feel we need to look deeper. What essentially is modernity. When does a society evolve to become Modern. Take Japan's case, its watershed is considered to be 1853, when the US Admiral Perry did a blockade of Japan forcing it to open its economy for trading with other nations. This had far reaching consequences for the political and social set up of Japan. It was the trigger which displaced the Samurai elite with their feudal medieval set up and ushered industrialization of Japan. Just about 50 years later, in 1905 Japan's navy was strong enough to defeat a European power like Russia.
Is 1707 that significant a date in Indian history. Medievalism did not die out with Aurangzeb, rather I believe it lasted more than a century after that.

In 1818 the British conclusively defeated the Marathas and thus the last of the Indian powers outside of its rule. Should 1818 be considered the important date. But Maratha power was majorly destroyed in the Battle of Assaye in 1803, when Scindia and Bhosle's forces were defeated by the British. For that matter should 1857 be considered that date, as that conclusively showed that feudal India was no match to imperialistic Britian, but an India with national consciousness was a serious threat. Please compare, in 1857 was India any more modern than say China or Japan. Yes telegraphy and railways had just been introduced, but that had not seeped into the society or become part of life. the life of an average Indian was hardly different from an average Chinese or Japanese, maybe more the poorer due to British oppression.

I would not like to say anymore, as I feel this is a discussion point where more can contribute.
Regards,
Kartik

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Tourists will soon enjoy the flavour of Rajputana style weddings in Gujarat</b>
Pioneer.com
Aneesha Sareen | Chandigarh
The ancient State of Gujarat is all set to lure tourists with the everlasting concept of royal weddings in heritage tourist spots and palaces and has special packages to offer keeping in view the fascinations of Non-Resident Indians and foreigners who come to India in large numbers, every year.

This was disclosed by adviser and travel planner from Gujarat JK Jhala, who was in the city to attend the 42nd Annual Convention of Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Associations (FHRAI).
 
Talking to the Pioneer on the sidelines of the convention, the travel adviser said that the State is ready to attract tourists the Rajasthani way, with weddings organised in royal palaces in complete 'Rajputana style'.

<b>"For these marriages vintage cars will be used and the ambience and the arrangements will transport you in the bygone era," he said.
 
He added that the proposal has already been approved and they have even started to receive orders from Non-Resident Indians.

"The foreigners are crazy for our culture and they are very enthusiastic about organising marriage in traditional Indian styles complete with all the requisite jewellery to get a feel of the ancient times," he said.

The palaces that have been roped in for the concept are Rajpipla Palace, which is just 20 kilometre from Narmada Dam, Gondal Palaces as well as the temples of Bhavnagar, he said. The package of the entire ceremony mounts to Rs 25 to 30 lakh and the concept will boost the tourism in country like anything</b>, he said.

Moreover,<b> a project of special transport on sea by the name of 'Palace on Sea' is already in the pipeline to promote tourism, he said. A coastal festival along the 1650 kilometre belt from Udvadha to Kanch Mandvi is also one of our proposed projects where hotels will line along the decorated beach,</b> he said.

In addition, plans are to divert tourists to Kutch desert to promote desert tourism in the State is on the anvil, he said.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

This should be fun. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

<b>Catholic nun jailed for 30 years for her part in Rwandan genocide</b>

[center]<b><span style='font-size:21pt;line-height:100%'>Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947</span></b>[/center]

[center]<b><span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Compiled for the SGPC
by
S. GURBACHAN SINGH TALIB</span></b>[/center]

IMHO, this should be on the First page of the following Threads :

1. Pakistan News and Discussion

2. Radicalisation Of Indian Muslims

3. Islamism
____________________________________________________________________

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Missing the big picture</b>At a time when Pakistan’s sprawling textile industry was confidently expecting large-scale increase in its exports, following the end of the textile quota, the foreign sales have come down by over 10 per cent during July-September compared to the same period last year.

According to present negative trends, the current quarter’s export performance, it is feared, may turn out to be far worse. Urgent remedial measures have to be taken by the government, industry and exporters, if the adverse trend is to be reversed decisively

<b>The fall in Pakistan’s textile exports has come at a time when not only South Asian <span style='color:blue'><i>[call it India]</i> competitors in this sector are doing very well but even Cambodia in the Far East </span>is said to be exporting more textiles than Pakistan</b>.

This has happened despite the<b> investment of five billion dollars on the expansion and modernisation of the industry and a million dollars more on the erection of factory buildings.</b>

And this has happened despite the assertion of the ebullient textile industrialists that they will do far better in a textile quota-free world.

While <b>Pakistan’s overall exports rose by only 2.9 per cent </b>in the first quarter of this financial year, <b>Indian exports went up by 37 per cent </b>in the first half of its financial year ending September 30. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

Pakistan’s July- September textile exports were for $2.449 billion against $2.73 billion in the first quarter of last year.

Official figures show <b>that export of almost all textile items, except cotton yarn and cotton carded, recorded a negative growth </b>despite the recent support package, fiscal and financial, announced by the government
........................
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Too bad, it will hurt them big time.

They had it coming <!--emo&:roll--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/ROTFL.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='ROTFL.gif' /><!--endemo-->
Wish someone gave the same treatment to the charlatans defending the convicted terrorist Afzal.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/05sadd...?q=np&file=.htm

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->There was a mixed reaction from Muslims across India on the death sentence awarded on Sunday to Saddam Hussein with some denouncing the verdict terming it as unfair, while others saying the former Iraqi president deserved the punishment.

<b>Shahi Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid Syed Ahmed Bukhari</b> said the verdict was planned much earlier and was announced by a puppet tribunal of the United States.

"We denounce the verdict which was planned by the invader (the United States). The judgement has been announced by a puppet tribunal of the US," he said.

"Instead of Saddam Hussein, Bush should have been put on trial for his crimes in Iraq where more than seven lakh people have been killed since US-led forces invaded the country," Bukhari said.

A member of the <b>All India Muslim Personal Law Board Qasim Rasool Ilyas</b> termed the trial of the deposed leader as unfair.

"We know he (Hussein) committed crimes against his own people. But, still the trial was not fair. There were many loopholes in the entire process," Ilyas said.

"Under international laws, every person has a right to get a free and fair trial but this has not happened in the case of Saddam Hussein," he said.

Hailing the verdict, <b>All India Shia Personal Law Board president Mirza Mohammad Athar</b> said the deposed leader was an "enemy of humanity" and he deserved the punishment.

Iraq's High Tribunal on Sunday found the former leader guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to death by hanging along with two of his associates.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu05...00.htm#Contents

Science, hegemony and violence

Table of Contents

A Requiem for Modernity

Edited by

ASHIS NANDY

THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY
TOKYO, JAPAN

DELHI
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS
1988

The United Nations University's Programme on Peace and Global Transformation was a major world-wide project whose purpose was to develop new insights about the interlinkages between questions of peace, conflict resolution, and the process of transformation. The research in this project, under six major themes, was co-ordinated by a 12-member core group in different regions of the world: East Asia, South-East Asia (including the Pacific), South Asia, the Arab region' Africa, western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, and Latin America. The themes covered were: Conflicts over Natural Resources; Security, Vulnerability, and Violence; Human Rights and Cultural Survival in a Changing Pluralistic World; The Role of Science and Technology in Peace and Transformation; The Role of the State in Peace and Global Transformation; and Global Economic Crisis. The project also included a special project on Peace and Regional Security.

Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP

The United Nations University
Toho Seimei Building, 15-1 Shibuya 2-chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan

© The United Nations University, 1988

Printed in India by P. K. Ghosh at Eastend Printers, 3 Dr Suresh Sarkar Road, Calcutta 700014 and published by S. K. Mookerjee, Oxford University Press YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110001

Contents

Preface

1. Introduction: Science as a reason of state

Notes

2. Francis Bacon, the first philosopher of modern science: A non-western view

Notes

3. Science, colonialism and violence: A luddite view

Notes

4. Atomic physics: The career of an imagination

Notes

5. Violence in modern medicine

Notes

6. Science and violence in popular fiction: Four novels of Ira Levin

Notes

7. Reductionist science as epistemological violence

Notes

8. On the annals of the laboratory state

Notes

Contributors



1. Introduction: Science as a reason of state

Notes

ASHIS NANDY

The thinking person cannot but notice that since the Second World War, two new reasons of state have been added to the traditional one of national security. These are science and development. In the name of science and development one can today demand enormous sacrifices from, and inflict immense sufferings on, the ordinary citizen. That these are often willingly borne by the citizen is itself a part of the syndrome; for this willingness is an extension of the problem which national security has posed over the centuries.

Defying protests by (and to the mortification of) pacifists and anti-militarists, a significant proportion of ordinary citizens in virtually every country have consistently and willingly died for king and country. There are already signs that at least as large a proportion of citizens is equally willing to lay down their lives heroically for the sake of science and development. In 1985, one Japanese doctor praised the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the indirect benefits they have brought to Japan. In an election held soon after the gas tragedy in 1984, the affected citizenry of Bhopal returned the same regime to power that shared the responsibility for the disaster. Likewise, demands for new steel mills and large dams often come from the very regions and sectors in the third world which are most likely to be the first victims of industrialization.

What are the sources of such commitment to the development of science, and the science of development? Can one identify and challenge the philosophical and ideological framework within which the commitment is located? Can one not go beyond shedding tears copiously over the misuse of modern science by wicked politicians, militarists and multinational corporations, and scrutinize the popular culture and philosophy of modern science? May the sources of violence not lie partly in the nature of science itself? Is there something in modern science itself which makes it a human enterprise particularly open to co-optation by the powerful and the wealthy?

These questions have been with us ever since Archimedes devised new weapons for his city state with the hope that they would remain the monopoly of his country and not also become the property of the ungodly. But the questions had a different ring for a long, long time. From the halcyon days of Archimedes to the heady days of early colonialism, science was primarily an instrument, not an end; certainly not the end of any nation or state. Even the states which drew the most handsome economic dividends from the discoveries of modern science and technology, or justified global dominance by referring to their scientific and technological power - I have in mind the nineteenth century colonial powers - did not see science as a reason of state. The reader may remember popular anecdotes about colonial adventurers, or scientifically-minded explorers who sometimes scared off or impressed the natives of Asia and Africa with new forms of black magic based on the discoveries of modern science. The civilizing mission of colonialism thrived on this folklore of encounter between western science and savage superstitions. But in each such instance, it was science that was put to the use of the colonial state; the state was not put to the use of science.

The nature of science has since then changed, and so has the nature of human violence. We are concerned in this volume with these changes and their interrelationships. It is the contention of the essays put together here that these changes can be understood with reference to the mediatory role played by the modern nation-state, the invitation which the culture of modern science extends to state power to use scientific knowledge outside the reaches of the democratic process and, above all, the growth of institutionalized violence in place of the personalized, face-to-face, impassioned violence associated with traditional concepts of sacrifice and feuds.1

Ivan Illich has traced the contemporary idea of development to a speech President Harry S. Truman made in 1945.2 Till then, the word 'development' had had other associations which had very little connection with what we understand by development today. But such was the latent social need for a concept akin to development that, once Truman gave it a new meaning, not only did it quickly acquire wide currency, it was also retrospectively applied to the history of social change in Europe during the previous three hundred odd years.

In a similar way, we can trace the idea of science as a reason of state to a speech made by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. The speech declared one of America's major national goals to be the scientific feat of putting a man on the moon. Though mega-science had already become an important concern of the state during the Second World War, science was, for the first time, projected in Kennedy's speech as a goal of a state and, one might add, as a substitute for conventional politics. A state for the first time on that occasion sought to out-rival another state not in the political or military arena, nor in sports, but in science redefined as dramatic technology. The formulation might have been older and might have been tried out haphazardly earlier but never had it been made so directly a part of the mainstream idiom of politics as in Kennedy's speech. Perhaps Kennedy was reacting to the Russian claim that the Sputniks showed the superiority of the socialist system and, especially, that of 'scientific socialism'. Perhaps he was trying to strengthen his political image as a leader who could help American society to cope with the scientific age. Whatever the reason, for the first time Kennedy's speech showed that a wide enough political base had been built in a major developed society for the successful use of science as a goal of state and, perhaps, as a means of populist political mobilization. Spectacular science could be now used as a political plank within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism.

Kennedy's speech had another implication. The boundary between science and technology had been softening for about two hundred years. The histories of science and technology could at one time be written separately. But since the early years of the Royal Society, modern scientists had intermittently been seeking legitimacy not only from the philosophical implications of their theories but also from the practical pay-offs of science. The process reached its symbolic culmination in Kennedy's concept of science - a concept which not merely incorporated technology; it gave spectacular technology the central place in science. The speech in fact anticipated the vision which occupies so much space in the popular culture of our day, namely, the image of a science which, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, will be coterminous with technology. By the mid-1980s the proportion of pure scientists to all scientists in the world had fallen to less than five per cent, and the proportion is reportedly falling at a faster rate now. The pure scientist today is an even rarer species than the scientist who does not participate in military research and development.

Yet, at the same time, we can be reasonably sure that the concept of pure science and the conceptual difference between science and technology will be carefully retained. It will be retained not because of the demands of the philosophers of science but because it is only by distinguishing between science and technology that all social criticism of science can continue to be deflected away from science towards technology. A shadowy, ethereal concept of science that has little to do with the real-life endeavours of practicing scientists can then be politically defended as the pursuit of truth uncontaminated by human greed, violence and search for power.

The studies assembled in this volume have these two basic issues - science as a new justificatory principle, and science as technological intervention - as their points of theoretical departure. However, these issues also intersect with a cultural dimension: all the studies are by Indian scholars and have primarily the Indian experience as their backdrop. This is only partly due to the accident of having an Indian editor for this volume. I shall argue that things could hardly have been otherwise.

India has been a remarkable example of an open society in which, since the early years of independence, the political élites have deliberately chosen to see science as the responsibility of the state and have, at the same time, treated it as a sphere of knowledge which should be free from the constraints of day-today politics. Every society decides what content to give to its politics and what to keep out of politics. The Indian state, representing the wishes of a powerful section of the nationalist movement and being led in the early years of independence by Jawaharlal Nehru, a gentleman Fabian steeped in the nineteenth-century vision of human liberation through science, decided to keep the practice of science outside politics but ensured that the scientific estate had a direct, privileged access to the state. It was as a part of this 'double vision' that Nehru, the modern élites which gathered around him, and the Indian state began to build science as a major source of justification for the Indian state as well as for their political dominance. That the formula did not keep science out of politics but only introduced another kind of politics into science is one of those paradoxes which lie at the heart of the distinctive relationship between science and society in contemporary India.

Thus, to mention a sector which enters the pages of this book often enough, the powers and freedoms that were given to nuclear scientists in India since the days of Homi Bhabha, India's first nuclear boss, were near-total. Firstly, nuclear scientists were freed from all financial constraints. The budget of the nuclear programme - the entire budget, not the budget devoted to research and development - was routinely pushed through parliament without any scrutiny whatsoever. And the expenditures - the entire expenditure, not only the expenditure on laboratories - were never publicly audited. All data on performance - this often boiled down to data on performance failures, unsafe technology and insufficient regard for human rights - were protected by law from the public gaze. And all enquiries made from outside the nuclear establishment were pre-empted with the help of a special act which made it impossible to mount any informed, focused, data-based criticism of India's nuclear programme.3

Secondly, nuclear scientists were given enormous scope for research if they moved out of the universities into special research institutions. While universities were starved of funds and allowed to decay, research institutions were richly funded. This might not have been a matter of deliberate policy but it certainly set a context to India's nuclear policy, because what scientists gained in research opportunities in the new institutions, they lost in personal political freedom. As I have already said, the specialized institutions set up by the state were strictly guided by the requirements of secrecy and political 'clearance'; they were expected to be professional, not academic. In other words, a systematic split between political and intellectual freedoms was institutionalized in this area right from the beginning and every young nuclear scientist was forced to choose between the two kinds of freedom.

Thirdly, once some of the finer minds of India were netted by the state in this manner and some of the less scrupulous among them were given access to power, the Indian nuclear programme could be safely handed over to the civilians; the army or the defence ministry did not need to be in the picture at all. The nuclear scientists could be their unofficial proxies. Thus, India's first nuclear explosion in 1974 was a civilian enterprise, with the army only playing second fiddle. Civilian scientists planned, initiated and executed the programme; the army and defence scientists played a peripheral role, providing organizational back-up, on-site security, and control or management of the villagers to be uprooted.

In fact, contrary to popular stereotypes, modern science or scientists in India have not been used by blood-thirsty generals, scheming politicians, and greedy businessmen. Rather, the science establishment, on its own initiative, has taken advantage of the anxieties about national security and the developmental aspirations of a new nation to gain access to power and resources. Not surprisingly, the record of mainstream scientists in India has been particularly poor in the matter of protecting democratic rights in the country. In fact, in recent years the privileged among Indian scientists have often been the most vigorous critics of civil rights groups struggling for protection against the hazards of a callous nuclear establishment.

I give the example of the Indian nuclear establishment not to make a scapegoat out of it but to draw attention to the manner in which the link between science and violence in India has been strengthened by forces within the culture of Indian science, forces which in other cultures of science in some other parts of the world have been either less visible or less powerful.

The curious case of the nuclearization of India has not one but three morals to it. First, as modern science gets more and more incorporated into technology, it necessarily has to be increasingly justified in terms of technology. The frequent exhortations to have a more 'scientific temper' (exhortations to which all Indians, but particularly the 'less civilized' traditional Indians, are subjected by the scientific and political establishments) and the repeated references to the scientific worldview as a philosophical venture in learned seminars in India are not taken seriously by 'normal' scientists (who do 'normal' science à la Thomas Kuhn), or by their political patrons and their admirers. For both, the slogan of the 'scientific temper' is a means of legitimizing their new-found status in Indian society. Both like to define the 'temper' as the spirit of technology and the instrumentalism which is an inescapable part of that spirit. The invocation of the 'temper' almost invariably goes with a negative reading of India's traditional cultures and ways of life, seen as impediments to a modern technological order, and with the search for uncritical legitimacy for all forms of technology - seen as an undifferentiated mass of knowledge, institutions and persons.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->I want Gujarat to compete with China: Modi

Sheela Bhatt in New Delhi | November 01, 2006 17:30 IST

Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi commenced a significant 6-day business tour to China on Wednesday accompanied by a high-level delegation of 35 Gujarat-based industrialists and top bureaucrats.

Almost side-stepping the feverish, and often acrimonious, debate involving Congress President Sonia Gandhi and most Indian chief ministers over the pros and cons of having Special Economic Zones in the country, Modi has already put in place the infrastructure to build 11 SEZs spread all over Gujarat.

He has a prospective plan for a total of 23 SEZs in Gujarat. He has also invited the Japanese to develop the SEZs on commercial terms suitable for international investors.

Modi's agenda during the visit to China is two-fold. He wants to study the functioning of the SEZ in China and, possibly, invite them to help Gujarat build China-style SEZs.

Second, he will also seek Chinese investment in Gujarat in the power sector.

Modi is keen that Chinese experts are involved in building and operating the SEZ.

In a bid to project himself as the champion of privatisation and globalization, Modi has toured Israel, Hong Kong and Australia in this connection in the last two years.

During his foreign tours, Modi keeps himself well-equipped with PowerPoint presentations, slide shows and printed publicity material.

In Singapore, he called on Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong on October 30. He also attended Global Entrepolis Conference where he pleaded his case forcefully to attract fresh investments into Gujarat.

In China, apart from Beijing, Modi will visit several centers that showcase modern China's phenomenal progress in recent years, including Shanghai, Schenzen, Deren, Pudong and Jurong.

A Gujarat government spokesman said that Modi would focus on the working of Chinese SEZ in sectors like gems and jewellery, electronics, fashion apparel.

Modi is projecting himself as an effective salesman of Gujarat's factors of advantage and intends to highlight the investor-friendly climate of economic development.

In Singapore he said, "Gujarat has a unique combination of a strategic geographic location, state-of-the-art infrastructure, multi-lingual workforce and concentration of corporate and financial resources and a world-class pro-business environment."

He hopes to attract Chinese investment into sectors like chemicals and pharmaceuticals, gas and oil, tourism and medical tourism.

Singapore dailies quoted Modi as saying that he proposed to come out with an "integrated township policy" for Gujarat and that his government would shortly come out with an exclusive 'Petroleum SEZ' "for servicing oil rigs and (to offer) other exploration and development services."

Noting that Gujarat encouraged private participation in port development, he said, "Our concept is to have port-based SEZs with backward linkages with warehouses, cold storage and transportation network."

Senior functionaries of Singapore government assured Modi that they would be taking part in the global investment summit to be organised early next year in Gujarat.

The denial of visa by the US authorities has obviously not deterred Modi from taking seriously the imperatives of 'globalisation.' Like yet another 'native' Indian political leader, Sharad Pawar, Nationalist Congress Party boss from Maharashtra, Modi too has taken pains to improve his command over the English language. In Singapore, Modi made it a point to deliver his lecture in English before a packed 800-strong audience.

Modi has planned China trip with a clear strategy to increase Gujarat's trade ties with China. Gujarat is one of the largest producers of cotton in India. Out of 440 million bales of cotton produced last year, China imported almost 330 million of bales from Gujarat.

Modi wants to set up exclusive SEZ if possible with the help of Chinese investors for 'value addition' to turn cotton into fabric and fashionable garments for exports.

Modi government enjoys excellent equations with some of India's prominent houses.

Essar Group chairman Shashi Ruia, Torrent Pharma chairman Sudhir Mehta, Adani Group chairman Gautam Adani, and Nirma chairman Karsanbhai Patel are among the industrialists accompanying Modi.

Prior to his departure on the current tour, Modi told a select gathering in Ahmedabad that "Gujarat is not competing with other states like Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. We may surpass them. I want Gujarat to compete with China, Germany and Japan."

Gujarat is among the fastest growing states in India. Against the national growth rate of around 7 per cent, Gujarat is galloping at over 12.5 per cent growth rate. Modi pointed out to his audience in Singapore that while India is struggling to achieve a 4 per cent farm sector growth rate, Gujarat's agriculture output was expanding by 11.2 per cent.

Curiously, the Sardar Sarovar Dam controversy will also echo in Modi's itinerary in China. He hopes to visit the Three Gorges Dam, the world's largest hydroelectric power dam, which has generated as much as controversy in China as the Sardar Sarovar Dam has in India.

Modi will be the second prominent figure of the Sangh Parivar to tour China in the run-up to the visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in November. Ram Madhav, spokesman of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, had earlier paid a week-long visit to China in September.

http://ia.rediff.com/money/2006/nov/01modi.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Hi Everybody,
I'm curious to know how much in modern India do people consider the status of others, for example, modern Indians living in the city still select the future Wife/Husband in relation to his/her appartenance to the same varna?
I know for the Jatee it's another discussion, probably easier.
Altough the constitution has delated with laws casta's differences, in the habits is this virtual division still alive?
For rurals I suppose it still is the same, but for the other Bharati?

Waiting for kind answers... <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/smile.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='smile.gif' /><!--endemo-->

Here you go again - Moron Singh And Queen's government logic at its best.

<b>Centre adds fuel to fatwa fire, defends Shariat courts</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
Amidst raging debate over ‘fatwas’ issued by Shariat courts, the Centre has defended the Muslims’ right to have such courts saying it was part of their fundamental right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

“The functioning of Dar-ul-Qaza would be protected under the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 25 and 26(b) of the Constitution,” the Centre said in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court in response to a PIL seeking ban on Shariat courts.

Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion while under Article 26(b) every religious denomination enjoys freedom to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.

The petition filed by one Vishwa Lohan Madan last year sought direction to the Centre and other authorities to ban ‘Shariat Courts’ for running a “parallel judicial system” in the country.

But the Centre said, <b>“Freedom guaranteed by Article 26 to every religious denomination or every section thereof to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion would include the freedom to establish Darul-Qaza/Nizam-ul-Qaza to settle disputes between two persons professing Islam, according to Sharia.”</b>
The Government emphasized that <b>“it is not a parallel judicial system” as the Qazis or Darul-Qaza/Nizam-e-Qaza did not prevent Muslims to report matters to the Judicial Machinery set up under the law of the land</b>.

<b>“Those who do not resort to Darul-Qaza/Nizam-e-Qaza are at liberty and fully entitled to resort to the court of law. </b>

There is no question of compelling anyone not to report matters to the judicial machinery<b>,” the affidavit filed by the Ministry of Law and Justice said. It also sought to dispel the impression that it created confusion in the minds of “uneducated multitude of Indian Muslim citizenry”.</b>

On the controversial issue of ‘fatwa’ issued by the ‘Shariat Courts’, the Centre said ‘fatwa’ meant “opinion” and even the seeker of opinion was not bound to follow it.

It submitted that <b>“the Mufti has no authority or powers to impose his opinion and enforce his ‘fatwa’ on anyone either by imposing any penalty as a fine or send him to jail.”</b>
Howver, it termed as “few bad examples” the ‘fatwas’ issued in cases relating to Imraana, Jyotsna Ara and Asoobi.

Justifying their role of ‘Shariat Courts’ in the Muslim society, the Centre said they “are conciliatory and/or mediatory for a, which strive to settle disputes outside the courts expeditiously in an amicable and inexpensive manner and have no real power or authority to enforce its orders.”

Terming the system of Islamic courts as a form of Alternative Disputes Redressal Forum, <b>the Government said, “it mainly performs conciliatory role without any enforcement powers.” </b>

The Centre said that in a number of cases Courts of Law have accepted the decision of Darul-Qaza and made them rule of the Court and passed decrees accordingly.

<b>“It is also in vogue in many non-Islamic countries, for example, in England,, which has a population of about 15 lakh Muslims, unofficial Sharia Panchayat are functioning.”</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->